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ABSTRACT
The U.S. government has been funding research into controlled thermonuclear fusion
since 1951.  Since 1957, when the program was declassified, a public record is available in
the form of appropriations and authorization reports presenting congressional decisions about
fusion research.  This report analyzes that record in order to assess how the program may fare
in the future.  The program recently underwent a major restructuring at the direction of
Congress, and is currently establishing plans about how to proceed toward the goal of
developing a practical fusion powerplant.  These plans are likely to be the subject of close
congressional scrutiny during  review of the FY2001 budget request from the Department of
Energy.  The report should be helpful, to Members and staff who will be part of that review,
in putting the program’s budget request into perspective.  It supplements a CRS Issue Brief,
IB91039, on the DOE Fusion Energy Sciences Program.  This report will be updated as
appropriate.
Congress and the Fusion Energy Sciences Program: 
A Historical Analysis
Summary
In FY1996, the Department of Energy’s Fusion Energy Science program carried
out a significant restructuring at the request of Congress.  The program’s budget was
reduced by 40% from the previous fiscal year, and the program was directed to
increase emphasis on fusion and plasma science research.  At the same time, the
program’s primary goal remains development of a long-term energy source.  While
Congress appears satisfied with the changes made by the fusion program since 1995,
it remains to be seen how that support will fare if and when the program again
requests funds to pursue development of a fusion power reactor.  
How Congress might address such a request will be informed by analyzing how
Congress has dealt with the program in appropriation and authorization actions since
its inception.  The program, which began in 1951 in the former Atomic Energy
Commission, was declassified in 1957.  In 1975, the program moved to the former
Energy Research and Development Administration and, in 1978, to the Department
of Energy.  
Since the fusion program’s declassification, congressional appropriations and
authorization reports provide a written record of congressional views about the
program.  From a review of those reports, nine themes emerge.  These themes are:
continuing support for the goals of fusion research, recognition of the long time
needed to reach the goal of fusion energy, uncertainty about the time needed to reach
program goals, larger and more complex facilities, international fusion research
competition and cooperation, federal budget constraints, relation to the nation’s
energy situation, debate over program focus — science vs. energy —  and the role of
alternative concept research.   Throughout the 42 years of congressional consideration
of fusion budget requests, these factors appear again and again, usually as prominent
issues, in the appropriations and authorization reports.
As Congress considers the program in the coming years, several questions are
likely to arise about how it should continue.  These questions, for the most part, are
extensions of the themes described above.  They include: is U.S. fusion research a
science or energy program? If fusion is a science program will it be sustained? As an
energy program, how long can fusion research be sustained? What will happen when
larger research facilities are requested? What would be the role of international
collaboration? Under what conditions could U.S. fusion research be expanded?  How
these questions are addressed and answered will likely determine the future of fusion
research in the United States.
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Congress and the Fusion Energy Sciences
Program: A Historical Analysis
Introduction
This report reviews and analyzes the 42-year history of congressional
deliberations over funding of the magnetic fusion research and development (R&D)
program.  That analysis provides the basis for an assessment about how the program
might fare in the future as it proceeds in the direction of developing a long-term
energy source from fusion.  The assessment is presented as a series of questions that
Congress may wish to address in determining the program’s future.
In 1995, Congress appropriated 40% less money than DOE requested for
FY1996 for the Fusion Energy Science (FES) Program of the Department of Energy.
In addition, Congress directed DOE to restructure the program, emphasizing fusion
and plasma science and to expand its efforts on alternate confinement concepts.
Congress also told DOE that it could expect no more than level budgets for the
foreseeable future and that it should integrate its plans for the restructured program
with the international fusion effort.1  Subsequent to this action, in 1998, Congress
directed DOE to discontinue its participation in the International Thermonuclear
Experimental Reactor (ITER) project upon completion of the U.S. commitment to the
project’s Engineering Design Activity in July 1998.  Congress provided enough funds
for FY1999 to close out DOE’s obligation to the project.2
Today, the DOE FES program is as small as it has been since the early 1970s,
as shown in Figure 1 (next page - see Appendix for data), which presents the budget
history of the program in year 2000 dollars. Two medium-sized  facilities are being
supported, the DIII-D tokamak device at General Atomics and the Alcator Mod-C
tokamak at MIT.  In addition, the program is funding an expanded effort in alternate
concepts and has placed significantly more emphasis on plasma and fusion science and
engineering. The program changed its name from Magnetic Fusion Energy to Fusion
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Figure 1.  Fusion R&D Funding History
(Year 2000 Dollars)
Energy Sciences and moved to the Science account within DOE.3  Currently, a series
of reviews have been or are in the process of being completed about the program and,
among other things, a convergence of magnetic and inertial fusion energy research
appears to be in the offing.   
Congress appears to be satisfied with the steps the program has taken and its
primary status as a science program.   For FY2000, Congress approved a budget $15
million above the request and in line with the recommendations of the Fusion Energy
Sciences Advisory Committee4 and the Fusion Task Force of the Secretary of
Energy’s Advisory Board.5  In the Conference Report on the FY2000 Energy and
Water Development Appropriations (H.Rept. 106-336), Congress approved the
support for the program expressed by the SEAB Task Force and urged DOE to
follow the recommendations of the FESAC report in allocating the additional funds
provided for FY2000.
Currently, there appears to be clear congressional support for the fusion program
as it now exists.   As long as the fusion program remains primarily focused on fusion
science and does not request significant increases in its budget, Congress probably will
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support the program.  The program, however, very likely cannot continue at its
current level indefinitely if progress towards a fusion power reactor is to be made.
At some point, larger machines are likely to be needed if  promising concepts are to
be tested and additional funds are likely to be requested.  How Congress will react to
such a request depends on factors that are uncertain at this time.  
Nevertheless, a review of congressional actions on the program’s budget
requests since the program was declassified in 1957 and the issues Congress has
addressed in the course of those deliberations is useful.  While the membership of
Congress has changed numerous times over that period, there are certain “constants”
about congressional responsibilities and interests related to the program.  These
“constants” include congressional appropriations and oversight duties, its
representational focus, and its fundamental interest is the nation’s well-being.  These
“constants” will continue to hold in the future, and are expected to channel
congressional response towards future fusion program budget requests in a manner
similar to that in the past depending on the conditions that prevail at the time.  
Historical Assessment
Background  
Magnetic fusion research (hereafter called the fusion program) originated as a
classified program in 1951 in the former Atomic Energy Commission.   Since
declassification in 1957, congressional consideration of the program’s budget request
and oversight of the program’s progress have been a matter of public record.  A large
hearing record has been built up over the last 42 years, along with an extensive report
record from the appropriation and authorization committees.
The fusion program remained in the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) until
1975, when the Commission was abolished.  At that time, fusion research was
included in the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA).  A
second change occurred in 1978 when ERDA was abolished and the fusion program
became part of the Department of Energy (DOE), where it has resided ever since.
For FY1958 and FY1959, the fusion program’s appropriation was included in the
Atomic Energy Commission Appropriations bill.   From FY1960 to FY1975, the
entire AEC appropriation,  and with it the fusion program’s appropriation, was
contained in the Public Works (to FY1967) and  the Public Works and Water
Development and Atomic Energy Commission (to FY1975) appropriations bills.  With
the formation of ERDA and subsequently DOE, the fusion program’s appropriation
was contained in the Public Works for Water Development and Energy Research
Appropriations bill (to FY1979) and finally the Energy and Water Development
Appropriations bill (to present).  Authorization was the responsibility of the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) through FY1977, and has since been the
responsibility of the House Science Committee and the Senate Energy and Natural
Resources Committee.
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Themes  
By examining the reports prepared by the congressional appropriations and
authorization committees in conjunction with the appropriations and authorization
bills covering the fusion program, an historical overview of how Congress has
regarded the federal effort to achieve controlled fusion can be readily obtained.
Several themes emerge from that overview about how Congress has dealt with the
program as it has undergone many changes over the past 42 years. 
1.  Continuing support for the goals of fusion research.   
From the program’s inception, Congress has acknowledged the  significant
potential of fusion energy as a long-term source of energy for the planet.  The fusion
research effort (first known as Project Sherwood in the AEC) was a high priority of
the JCAE.6  During the 1960s, the JCAE continued to note the potential benefits of
fusion and urged the AEC to provide more resources for the program.  In the 1970s,
when the nation began experiencing the energy problems it would face throughout the
decade, both the JCAE and the Appropriations committees asserted support for the
program and recognition of its long-term potential.  Concern was often expressed by
Congress, in this context, about the slow pace of development.  For example, in
consideration of the FY1972 AEC budget, the House Committee on Appropriations
stated,
The Committee continues to be concerned at the slow pace of the development of
this program which, if successful, could be the answer to the long range energy
problems facing the Nations and the world. ... the Committee believes that we must
proceed now without further delay.  This is more reason, however, for the AEC to
place greater current emphasis on this program ... for acceleration of this research
and development effort in the public interest.7
During the mid-1970s, Congress begin authorizing and appropriating funding
increases for the program above the requested amounts.  In 1972, the JCAE noted
with approval the establishment of a separate division within the AEC for controlled
thermonuclear research as indicative of the program’s importance.8   Fusion was
viewed as the likely key to the nation’s long-range energy future. This support
continued throughout the 1970s.  In 1978, both the House and Senate Committee on
Appropriations, in considering the FY1979 DOE budget request, stated,
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actions reflected the new Administration’s desire to reduce federal funding of R&D it believed
was best carried out by the private sector but to continue support of basic research.  The
fusion program budget request grew to $483.1 million for FY1985, but declined sharply over
the next two years to $333 million for FY1987.
12 The House Committee on Appropriations had in FY1985 recommended a reduction of $64
million from the request (see below).
However, the potential promise of a clean, inexhaustible source of energy from the
fusion process is of sufficient importance to warrant an aggressive development
program.9
Both committees recommended increases to the funds being requested.
In 1980, Congress passed the Magnetic Fusion Energy Engineering Act, which,
among other things, provided a recognition of the importance of continued pursuit of
the goal of commercial production of energy from fusion.  In addition to the potential
energy benefits, Congress stated that successful fusion energy development in the
United States could mean substantial economic benefits for the country.10  
In the early 1980s, Congress continued to express its support of the fusion R&D
program, although the rapid funding growth of the 1970s ceased.  While the Reagan
Administration dramatically reduced requests for most of the energy R&D funded by
DOE in FY1981, it did not do so for fusion research until FY198611. Language in the
appropriations committees’ reports continued to express a belief in the potential long-
term energy, environmental, and economic benefits of fusion energy.  That language
had not changed significantly since the early 1960s.  Congress also supported the
Administration’s budget requests until FY1985.  From FY1985 to FY1988, however,
funding for fusion research declined substantially, triggered in part by the large drop
in the request from FY1985 to FY1986.12 Some of that decline was also due to
congressional actions that reduced the appropriation below the request in three of
those years.  Nevertheless, Congress continued to express its support of the fusion
effort.  Both House and Senate Committees on Appropriations continued to note long
support of the program and continued interest in its success.  In 1988, for example,
the Senate Committee on Appropriations in reporting its recommendations on the
FY1989 DOE budget request stated,
Because of uncertainties in the long-term energy supply, it is important to maintain
steady progress toward the realization of fusion energy.  The Committee has,
therefore, long been supportive of the fusion program and believes it is important
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for the Government to support the program through the present research phase
until a definitive engineering and economic assessment can be performed.13
In the 1990s, Congress maintained its support of the goals of the fusion program
but effected significant changes in its financial support.  Funding for FY1996 was
reduced by 40% from the request. Even before that reduction, however, Congress
was tightening the budget allocations for the program and restricting the start of new
major projects. While explicit language emphasizing that Congress had long supported
the goals of fusion and continued to do so was notably absent during the decade, the
ultimate value of the program was not questioned in report or bill language either.
Congress continued to note the long-term energy focus of the program.  In its report
for the FY1993 DOE appropriations, the Senate Committee on Appropriations noted,
the Committee ... endorses a magnetic fusion energy program that can lead to an
ultimate long-term advanced energy source for the country ... .14
Even after the FY1996 changes, expressions of support continued.  In the FY2000
DOE appropriations report, the House Committee on Appropriations stated, 
The Committee remains committed to a fusion program that is based on ... the
ultimate goal of practical fusion energy.15
During the 42-year span that witnessed substantial changes in budget levels,
congressional support for a federally funded fusion energy R&D effort and for its goal
appears to have remained high.  Over that period, Congress has noted also other
benefits of the program such as advances in plasma science and engineering and the
production of many highly trained scientists and engineers.
2.  Recognition of the long time needed to reach the goal of fusion energy.
Another theme of congressional consideration of fusion R&D budgets over the
years has been the awareness that success in achieving the goal of energy production
from controlled fusion would take a long time.  There has been an acknowledgment
that achieving successful energy production from fusion would be one of the most
challenging scientific and technical endeavors ever attempted. Estimates have changed
since 1957 of how long it would take to reach that goal from the year in question.
The Magnetic Energy Fusion Engineering Act of 1980, adopted a 20-year time frame
by setting a goal of 2000 for the demonstration of fusion power.  As discussed below,
DOE, at the time, believed that demonstration could be obtained in less time if annual
funding levels were increased.  The 20-year period, however, has been the most
optimistic time frame considered by Congress with periods of 40 to 50 years cited in
the early 1980s.
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The recognition of the long period that would be required for success meant that
fusion was never considered an immediate oil replacement energy source.
Furthermore, fusion was not considered a direct competitor to near-term fission
energy, i.e., the light water reactor. 16 Indeed, the JCAE stated in 1967
.... fusion research and its later development can stimulate the nuclear fission
effort, including the infant breeder program ... . 17
 
The program has been considered along with solar and, during the 1970s, the breeder
reactor, as the leading candidate for the nation’s primary long-term energy source.
In 1975, the House Committee on Appropriations stated, 
Two of the most important potential sources of infinite energy are solar power and
controlled thermonuclear fusion. ... The Committee strongly supports these two
programs although the payoff ... is in the distant future.18
In 1981, it stated,
Both the nuclear fission and fusion programs [within DOE] offer the potential for
virtually inexhaustible energy resources for the future.19
This absence of near-term competition probably contributed to congressional support
of the program for such a long period.  Congress appears to have accepted the notion
that short-term goals are not meaningful for this program and has judged it more on
how it has advanced fundamental scientific and technical knowledge of plasma physics
and fusion science and engineering.  In this sense, Congress may have been judging
the program in a manner similar to how it considered other long-running basic
research programs such as high-energy physics.
3.  Uncertainty about the time needed to reach program goals.
While recognizing the long-term nature of the fusion R&D effort, Congress also
continually probed fusion program officials about how long would it take to reach
program goals of scientific and commercial demonstration.  During the 1960s, when
progress was slow, Congress on several occasions exhorted AEC officials to focus
on the most promising concepts in order to permit savings and accelerate progress.20
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In 1967, the JCAE stated its belief that the feasibility of fusion could be demonstrated
within 10 to 11 years, in line with a target date set by the AEC for itself.21  In the early
1970s, the appropriations committees began to express concern about the slow pace
of the program.  For the FY1971 AEC appropriations, the House Committee on
Appropriations stated,
The committee has long been concerned at the slow pace of the development of this
program which, if successful, could be the answer to the energy problems facing
the Nation and the world.22
Such expressions coincided with the first concerns about the nation’s energy future.
When the program began to make significant advances in the early 1970s with the
advent of the tokamak, Congress began to press for closer targets for achieving
scientific feasibility.  In 1972 the JCAE noted that during hearings it had held in 1971
on the fusion program, a date of 1980 was advanced as possible by the AEC for
achieving scientific feasibility assuming adequate funding.23 Based on those
statements, program funding was increased over the requested amounts.  In 1974, in
response to AEC statements that a demonstration power reactor would not be
possible before the late-1990s rather than the mid-1990s given in earlier estimates, the
JCAE increased the authorization for the program and directed an acceleration of
efforts.
When the fusion program was absorbed by ERDA in 1976, the program’s pace
slowed and it was reported to the JCAE in 1976 that a demonstration power reactor
could not be ready before the 2005 to 2010 period.  A 1976 report prepared by
ERDA presented funding requirements for achieving a demonstration plant in the late
1990s, but the Administration chose to proceed at a slower pace with smaller budget
requirements.24  At that time, the Committee found “this slippage to be unacceptable”
and directed that the program be accelerated to meet  a late-1990s goal and added
funds to the authorization.25 
In the early 1980s, Congress noted the possibility that demonstration of scientific
feasibility could be close because it was expected that the Tokamak Fusion Test
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Reactor (TFTR), then under construction, might be able to achieve energy breakeven
when using deuterium and tritium. Successes on the tokamak during the 1970s had
made fusion researchers optimistic about being able to achieve that goal.  Based on
those successes and the findings of the above-mentioned 1976 ERDA report,
Congress enacted the Magnetic Fusion Energy Engineering Act of 1980 in an attempt
to accelerate development of practical fusion power.26  That Act set 1990 as the target
for a fusion engineering device and 2000 for a demonstration reactor.  Appropriations
action, however, did not provide the funds that the Act authorized to meet the 2000
target.  In 1983, Congress stated that even though demonstration of scientific
feasibility appeared close, it would still be a very long time to practical power,
requiring considerable basic science research.27  Congress did not give any indication
of how long it believed that period to be. 
The following year, the House Committee on Appropriations expressed concern
with statements from DOE that practical fusion power was 40 to 50 years off.   In
1989, Congress noted that the date that commercial fusion power might be achieved
continued to move further away.28 The realization that it would take at least several
decades to reach a commercial fusion power plant seems to have marked a turning
point in congressional treatment of the program.  Since the late 1980s, no mention has
been made by Congress of explicit target dates.29  Furthermore, while remaining
supportive of the program’s goals, Congress began to try to change the focus of the
program more towards science, and its budgetary support started to decline.  It is
likely that the large budgetary requirement of continuing the program for 40 to 50
years at the level of effort existing in the late 1980s has been a major factor in the
reorientation of the program that Congress directed over the last 15 years.
4. Larger and more complex research facilities.
Almost from the onset, progress in fusion research has required larger and larger
facilities.  Congress has acknowledged that need, and a major portion of its
appropriation and authorization efforts about the fusion program has been directed
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at reviewing requests for those facilities.  While Congress was generally supportive
of larger machines until the late 1980s, questions continually arose about the
program’s efforts to determine which of the facilities were the most promising.  (It is
worth noting that such support did not result in the construction of any new major
facilities past 1983 for reasons that will be discussed below.) This was particularly
true during the 1960s when the program was pursuing several different approaches.
In the early 1960s, Congress directed the AEC on two occasions to choose among the
five options the agency was pursuing in order to make more efficient use of limited
budget resources.30  The AEC did not comply, stating it was premature to select a
most promising option.
During the 1970s, when fusion program budgets were rising rapidly and the
tokamak concept emerged, Congress generally backed AEC, ERDA, and DOE
requests for construction of ever-larger machines, primarily tokamaks.  That support,
however, was often accompanied by requests for more evidence of success.  In 1974,
the JCAE stated,
The Joint Committee also notes the desire of the Commission to proceed with
larger experiments.  While the scientific progress during the year appears to justify
this action, the Joint Committee encourages the Commission to demonstrate
scientific feasibility before building the more expensive larger experiments.31 
Nevertheless, two years later Congress approved start of construction of the
Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor (TFTR), the largest project to date in the U.S.
magnetic fusion program.32  Congress also anticipated that this project would "allow
the first major demonstration of scientific breakeven."33 
When funding leveled off in the early 1980s, however, it was necessary for DOE
to shut down a large facility testing the magnetic mirror concept.   In the mid-1980s,
Congress acknowledged the likelihood that an ignition experiment would eventually
be needed following successful demonstration of scientific feasibility in the TFTR.  At
the time, however, it directed DOE to focus its efforts more on establishing the
scientific base needed for fusion energy and to delay any commitment to such a
project until FY1987.34   Nevertheless. Congress provided funds to begin preliminary
CRS-11
34 (...continued)
1985, 98th Congress, 1st Session, H.Rept. 98-755.
35 House Committee on Appropriations, Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill,
1988, 100th Congress, 1st Session, H.Rept. 100-162, 80.
36 Conference Committee, Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill, 1993, 102nd
Congress, 2nd Session, H.Rept. 102-866, 77.
37 Senate Committee on Appropriations, Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill,
1994, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, S.Rept. 103-147, 95.
planning work on a larger ignition tokamak that would be called the Compact Ignition
Torus (CIT).35  In the early 1990s that project was canceled by DOE with
congressional consent.
In the early 1990s, Congress approved DOE participation in the engineering
design of the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project.
This program allowed Congress to approve the design of a large experiment to
demonstrate scientific and engineering feasibility of fusion. The experiment’s cost
would be shared by the international fusion research community.  In 1992, Congress
gave DOE approval to begin preliminary work on the tokamak physics experiment
(TPX), a follow-on device to the TFTR.36  The TPX was to be a steady-state tokamak
that would supplement the ITER facility.  In 1993, however, the Senate Committee
on Appropriations, expressing concerns about the TPX, stated,
While the Committee supports design activities related to TPX, the Committee is
concerned that moving forward with construction of TPX, in absence of a
commitment from other countries to build ITER, runs a serious risk that any U.S.
investment in TPX will be lost.37
 
Finally, in 1995, Congress reduced the fusion budget significantly, as discussed above,
resulting in the end of the TPX project.  Concerns about ITER resulted in termination
of U.S. involvement in that project three years later.
The history of congressional decisions about fusion program requests for larger
facilities has been somewhat mixed.  Recognition by Congress that such facilities
would be needed to advance fusion research toward the goal of practical power
production has been tempered by concerns about the pace of the program and budget
constraints.  It seems clear that the latter has dominated since about 1985.
Nevertheless, as attested by approval of construction of the National Spherical
Tokamak Experiment (NSTX) as well as upgrades of the two existing large tokamaks
—  the DIII-D and Alcator C-Mod — Congress remained, to a degree, supportive of
large device fusion research.
5.  International fusion research competition and cooperation.
From the outset, fusion research has been an international effort.  Throughout
the last 42 years, Congress has been supportive of U.S. participation in that effort,
although at times, that support has been tempered by concerns about international
competition.  Furthermore, until the late 1980s, when ITER first appeared,
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international considerations were mentioned only briefly in reports accompanying
appropriations and authorization legislation. 
During the 1960s, Congress  made note of the research efforts being carried out
by other nations including the Soviet Union, and on occasion suggested that
international research efforts were growing faster than those in the U.S.38  The
introduction of the tokamak into the U.S. research program was accompanied by
congressional statements referring to the Soviet success in the development of that
concept.39   In 1971, the JCAE expressed approval of the free flow of information
among the several countries engaging in fusion research.  It stated,
The Joint Committee recognizes the fact that considerable progress has been made
in the past few years by teams of scientists in this and other countries, and
commends the outstanding international cooperation as reflected by symposia
where information is exchanged and reciprocal visits to facilities in various
nations.40
During the energy price shocks of the 1970s, the international focus of Congress
appeared to be primarily on how successful development in the U.S. could aid the
nation’s long-term energy independence. This factor might have contributed to the
rapid increase in fusion budgets during the decade.
In the 1980s, the international focus shifted toward cooperation.  House
authorization bills over that period directed DOE to continue international
cooperative efforts.  The report accompanying the FY1981 bill stated,
In addition, a continued international cooperative effort should be maintained to
ensure the most rapid progress possible with respect to physics and technology
developments pertinent to advancing fusion power production.41
The importance of international cooperation was also part of the Magnetic Fusion
Energy Engineering Act of 1980, although Congress directed that such cooperation
not dissipate U.S. leadership in fusion research.42  The Act also noted that successful
U.S. development of fusion power would be of substantial economic benefit.  
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In the mid-1980s, the shift toward encouraging international cooperation
intensified, and comments about international cooperation began to appear regularly
in the reports.  Congress began to assert that the development of fusion power would
require an international effort, and that DOE should seek cooperative funding to make
full use of domestic funds.  It recommended international participation in an ignition
experiment.43  At the same time, Congress requested a plan from DOE on
international cooperation.  The plan was designed to ensure that there was no
duplication of major facilities and that U.S. interests were protected by ensuring an
equitable distribution of responsibilities.44   In 1986, Congress noted the initial
discussions among the major fusion research  nations on the ITER experiment.45 
Funding for the initial design of ITER was first provided by Congress in FY1988.  In
the early 1990s, Congress made special note of how important it considered the ITER
project and broader international cooperation to achieving practical fusion power.
The House Committee on Appropriations stated,
The Committee expects the Department of Energy (DOE) to remain a full and
vigorous partner in the Engineering Design Activity (EDA) of the International
Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) and the Committee considers this
collaboration a model of successful partnerships on large, scientific projects.46
In addition, legislation was reported in the Senate in 1994 that would have made
ITER the primary focus of the domestic program.47 Although Congress ended U.S.
participation in the ITER project in the FY1999 appropriations bill, it stated in the
conference report that the action was not a judgement about the value of international
fusion research ventures.  Rather, questions were raised about whether the “tokamak
is the most promising technology” and “whether the current partners in ITER are
willing and able to meet their commitments.”48  In the FY1999 conference report,
Congress reiterated its support of international collaboration and encouraged
continued DOE efforts.49
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While Congress has expressed interest in the international aspects of the fusion
program from its beginnings, emphasis on international cooperation has risen
significantly during the past 15 years, reaching a peak with the ITER EDA.  Even
with the demise of that program, however, Congress appears to believe that eventual
success in obtaining fusion energy production will require an international effort.
6.  Federal budget constraints.
Throughout the past 42 years, Congress has on a number of occasions stated that
budget constraints limited its support of the fusion program.  That was especially true
in the 1960s and from the late 1980s to the present time.  Late in the 1960s, budget
constraints were cited by the JCAE as the reason for withdrawing its prior approval
of a plan to double the program’s budget from FY1968 to FY1973.50  During the
1970s, however, the focus on energy issues appears to have overcome concerns about
budget limitations.  
The situation begin to change in the early 1980s, as energy receded as a policy
issue.  In 1981, the Senate Committee on Appropriations cited fiscal austerity in
directing DOE to take special efforts to control costs on its proposed fusion
engineering device.51  In 1988, budget constraints were cited by Congress as the
reason for denying any of the requested construction funds for the compact ignition
torus proposal.52  While not explicitly stated, the large funding reduction that took
place in 1995 was driven, to a large degree, by congressional desires to rein in federal
spending.  Finally, in referring to its actions for FY1997, Congress noted budget
pressures in being unable to provide the full request even though it expressed approval
of the steps DOE had taken in reorienting the program.53
While concerns about federal spending have existed throughout most of this
period, Congress has not often invoked those concerns in dealing with the program’s
budget request.  It seems clear that while fiscal constraints are an important
consideration for Congress, other issues, such as the nation’s energy problems, may
override those constraints to some degree.
7.  Relation to the nation’s energy situation.
Congressional treatment of the fusion program and Congress’s view of the
nation’s energy situation have been intertwined since the program’s beginning.
During the early 1960s, when energy prices were stable and supplies apparently
secure, Congress supported the program with essentially no budget growth.  Although
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it acknowledged fusion had great potential as a long-term energy supply option, as
described above, Congress did not express any urgency about the program.  As the
1970s began, however, and pressure mounted on energy prices and supply, fusion
research took on a new importance.  Even though fusion was  considered a long-term
option with no prospect to relieve the immediate problems, Congress took steps to
accelerate development of options it believed would provide long-term energy
security for the nation. As early as 1971, the House Committee on Appropriations
noted the importance of energy as stated above. As a result, the budget for the
fusion program grew dramatically, and Congress on occasion increased funding above
the requested amount.
In the 1980s, the energy pressures abated as the price of oil began to fall from
the peaks of the late 1970s.  Congress continued to acknowledge the importance of
the potential of fusion (see above), but the urgency of the 1970s appeared to abate.
When combined with the realization that a practical fusion power plant was much
further away than had been believed during the late 1970s, budget support began to
decline.  In 1982, the House Committee on Appropriations noted,
Fusion has the potential of becoming a principal energy option for the Nation in
the next century.   This potential is based on a number of important features — the
fuel reserves for fusion are vast, are readily available to all, and are free from the
threat of embargo; .... Even so, obtaining economic fusion energy is a very long-
term prospect .... The Committee endorses this measured approach [balancing
science with a desire to proceed with engineering demonstration] of the Department
[DOE].54
In the 1990s, energy concerns receded further from congressional consideration
with respect to the fusion program.  To be sure, Congress continued to recognize the
ultimate objective of fusion as discussed above.  In 1990, the Senate Committee on
Appropriations noted,
The target for completion of magnetic fusion development is determined by the
present technical, economic, and political uncertainty of energy supply.55
While a desire to control federal spending was at the heart of the 1995 funding
reduction, those actions were probably made easier by the absence in Congress of any
overriding urgency about the need for new long-term energy sources.  In addition,
that belief also appears to have been part of the congressional direction that the
program focus more on science and less on energy technology development.
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8.  Debate over program focus – science vs. energy.
An issue that has emerged in the past few years is about the broad focus of the
fusion program.  In 1998, the program was moved by direction of Congress from the
DOE energy supply account to the DOE Science account.56  The move appeared to
be justified because of the intensified focus of the program on plasma and fusion
science and engineering.  The question that has emerged is whether the fusion
program is now a science or an energy program.  
For nearly all of the 42 years the fusion program has been declassified,
appropriations and authorization report language emphasized the energy goals of
fusion.  While recognizing the long-term nature of fusion energy development, as
described above, it is clear that Congress considered the fusion program primarily an
energy program.  Indeed, it is unlikely that Congress would have supported the
program at the levels it has if advancement of plasma physics, not energy, was the
primary goal of the program.  On the other hand, Congress on many occasions over
the years has referred to the scientific development of fusion.  From 1960 to 1972,
fusion research was included in the physical research division of the AEC, which
contained all of the Commission’s civilian basic research.  For the most part, the
programs of the DOE’s Office of Science evolved from those physical research
programs.  In 1964, the JCAE noted,
The controlled thermonuclear research program has, by it very existence,
stimulated a completely new area of research — plasma physics.  Because of this
stimulus, basic knowledge about this newly recognized form of matter, different
from solid, liquid, or gas —a fourth state of matter — is now available. .... The
committee believes that the intrinsic results of the controlled thermonuclear
program and the stimulated new outputs from plasma physics research justify the
investment in controlled thermonuclear research.57
The Committee also noted the broad range of applications of that new knowledge.
  
During the 1970s, the attention of Congress focused almost exclusively on the
energy goals of the fusion program.  In 1972, the AEC created a separate division for
controlled thermonuclear (fusion) research, a move that was approved by the JCAE.58
While no specific mention was made of the science aspects of the fusion program
during the 1970s, Congress continued to support the basic and applied plasma physics
elements of the program in order to provide a base for achieving scientific feasibility.
For example, for the FY1974 appropriations, the House Committee on
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Appropriations increased the fusion program’s budget by $4.7 million “to accelerate
the program to achieve scientific feasibility of controlled thermonuclear fusion.”59
In the 1980s, a shift in emphasis began toward the science aspects of the
program.  To be sure, the science discussed was that underlying the fusion energy
effort, and not plasma physics in general.  The decade began with the Magnetic Fusion
Engineering Energy Act of 1980, which directed DOE to put most of its emphasis on
engineering and technology development leading to power production.60  In 1982,
however, Congress appeared to endorse an approach that would balance scientific
goals with engineering goals. (See above, reference 54).  In 1984, the House, in
expressing concern about the pace of the program, directed DOE to shift program
focus to the establishment of the science base needed for fusion energy before
proceeding with engineering development.61  The Senate, that year, also directed DOE
to focus its efforts on establishing scientific feasibility in the TFTR before making a
commitment to an ignition experiment.62  From that point until 1995, Congress
appeared to direct DOE to concentrate on both sound scientific research and the long-
term goal of  electric power generation from fusion.  This direction was based on a
DOE strategic plan development that emphasized, in the near term, establishment of
the scientific and technological data base needed for fusion energy development.63  In
1986, Congress also noted other benefits of fusion research:
fusion research has resulted in significant advances in other areas of technology
and scientific research ....  It has also made outstanding contributions to the
education of a generation of scientists and engineers with ... skills that are
invaluable to the Nation for fusion and other high technology research. 64
In the 1990s, concerns about the program’s direction and pace grew.  One result
was that Congress began to increase its call for DOE to emphasize science relative to
energy technology development.  In 1990, the House Committee on Appropriations
recommended that “the Department focus its research activities in a scientifically
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oriented program.”65  Yet the energy goal was not abandoned but rather was included
with science goals.  In 1992, the Senate Committee on Appropriations stated,
the Committee ... endorses a magnetic fusion energy program that can lead to an
ultimate long-term advanced energy source for the country while broadening our
understanding of plasma science and developing advanced technologies.66
In 1995, Congress accelerated the change of program emphasis to plasma science and
engineering.  DOE was directed to restructure the program to emphasize fusion
science and alternative concepts.  In subsequent years, Congress has approved the
restructured program that now has plasma and fusion science as a primary focus.
Symbolic of this restructuring was the program’s name change from magnetic fusion
energy to fusion energy sciences.  Congress continues to recognize the ultimate
energy goal of fusion through congressional support of DOE’s “balanced program”
that considers both scientific advancement and energy development as its goals.  In
1999, the House Committee on Appropriations stated,
The Committee remains committed to a fusion program that is based on both
quality science and the ultimate goal of practical fusion energy.67
The view that success in fusion was a lot further off than believed or hoped
during the 1970s and early 1980s, combined with budget constraints, has caused
Congress to direct changes in the fusion program’s focus over the last 15 years.  To
a significant degree, those two factors may be related.  If funding had been available,
scientific feasibility might have been proven and, possibly, a demonstration plant could
have been operating within the time frames projected in the 1976 ERDA study and
the followup 1979 analysis for the House Science and Technology Committee.  DOE
and Congress, of course, decided not to take that course, and Congress redirected the
program more towards science.  Today, from a congressional perspective energy
appears to be a primary goal for the program.  The emphasis on science likely reflects
Congress’s desire that the basis for an eventual fusion power reactor be as solidly
grounded in fundamental science and engineering as possible.
9.  The role of alternative concept research.
Another topic that recurs during congressional consideration of the fusion
program is  the emphasis on alternative concepts and the role of one such concept in
particular, inertial confinement fusion (ICF).  Sporadically, throughout the past 42
years, Congress has included these topics in report language.  It has on occasion
called on the fusion program to put more resources into the development of
alternative concepts that might provide a less complex path to a practical fusion
powerplant.  These calls were relatively rare, however, until the last few years when
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Congress directed the major restructuring of the program.  In the FY1996 Conference
Report, the conferees stated,
The restructured program should emphasize continued development of fusion
science, increased attention to concept development, and alternative approaches to
fusion ....68
That was not the first call, however, for more research on alternative concepts.
Congress called for more effort on alternative concepts in 1974 when the JCAE asked
the AEC “to keep an active interest in and support of exploratory concepts ....”69  In
1978, the House Committee on Appropriations recommended that DOE “pursue an
aggressive evaluation of the small fusion system concepts to determine the potential
of such alternative concepts ... .”70  Similarly, the House Committee on Science and
Technology in 1979 urged DOE to take such actions.71  In 1984, the House
Committee on Appropriations noted that it “attaches a high value to maintaining a
broad and vigorous base program with emphasis on .... tokamaks, mirrors, and
alternative concepts.”72  In 1995, as noted above, Congress directed  major changes
in the fusion research program and has continued to emphasize support of alternative
concepts.
The alternative fusion concept that Congress has given the most attention to is
inertial confinement fusion (ICF).  Since the 1960s, Congress has been funding
research in ICF first at the AEC, then ERDA, and now DOE.  While the primary
focus of the ICF program has been to support the nation’s nuclear weapons program,
Congress has also noted over the years the potential contribution of ICF research to
the overall effort to achieve energy production from fusion.73  In 1976, when ERDA
took over the AEC research activities, Congress consolidated ICF and magnetic
fusion under the general title of fusion power R&D within its appropriations accounts
even though the ICF program was under ERDA’s atomic weapons activities.74
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Apparently, Congress considered both programs to have the same objective, although
it did note the weapons applications of ICF (laser fusion at the time) as well.75  When
DOE was established, however, the ICF program was moved by Congress to the
nuclear weapons R&D appropriation account and no longer was considered jointly
with magnetic fusion.  Nevertheless, Congress did acknowledge that there were
civilian applications of ICF.76  And, in the early 1980s, the House, on occasion,
directed DOE to fund a small amount of ICF research on civilian applications within
the magnetic fusion program.77 Because the Senate did not agree to this action,78
however, throughout the 1980s research on the civilian applications of ICF remained
within the main ICF program under DOE’s weapons activities.  
In 1989, the Senate noted that DOE was adopting a new policy that would
consider both inertial and magnetic fusion.  While expressing concern about the long
time it took “to put a stable and logical fusion program in place”, the Committee’s
statement implied support for consideration of both options.79  In 1991, Congress
once again provided funding within the magnetic fusion program for research on
civilian applications of inertial fusion energy.80  Such funds continue to be provided
to this day.  Indeed, for FY1994 and FY1995, Congress added funds to that activity
above those requested by DOE.   Finally, in 1998, Congress directed DOE to
undertake a thorough review of all of the fusion R&D it funded to develop an
integrated fusion energy research effort.  Most of the ICF effort, however, would
remain within the DOE defense programs.
Congressional attention on alternative concepts has risen as estimates of the time
to reach commercial fusion have grown.  Part of that heightened attention was likely
a result of increased concern by Congress that the mainline approach — the tokamak
— might not be the best path to a practical fusion reactor, and that DOE should not
bet everything on one approach.  Congress, in recent years, has directed DOE, as part
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of the fusion program's restructuring, to ensure that alternative concept exploration
be a key element of the fusion research effort.
Consequences for the Future
Current Status  
At present, the Fusion Energy Sciences program has completed most of the
restructuring mandated by Congress over the past five years.  Several reviews of the
program have been completed and DOE is preparing a research management plan
based on the recommendations of the Fusion Energy Science Advisory Committee in
concert with the findings of the Fusion Task Force of the Secretary of Energy’s
Advisory Board.81  The recommendations have two major aspects.  The first is the
development of an R&D roadmap that incorporates a convergence of the inertial and
magnetic fusion energy paths.  The roadmap is being designed to guide the program
towards development of a demonstration fusion power reactor sometime in the next
50 years.  The second aspect is the development of a vertical strategy to guide
decision making for moving a concept for achieving fusion power production from
the concept exploration stage to the demonstration stage, as laid out in the roadmap.
Questions
As stated at the beginning of this report, Congress appears to be well satisfied
with the program’s current status and the direction in which it is heading.   The
profound changes that have taken place since 1995, and which were set in motion 17
years ago, have left the program much different than it was for most of its existence.
In one sense it is similar to its earliest years — prior to the mid-1960s — in that U.S.
fusion research is again focused primarily on developing the scientific basis for fusion
energy production.  Of course, there have been vast advances in fusion science and
technology over the past 42 years (see below), and the present scientific effort is
building on a much greater knowledge base. 
In the next several years, as the science base is expanded further, the program
and Congress will be faced with critical choices about how the program should
continue.  The most important of these questions are likely to be about extensions of
the themes described above. By examining those questions in light of the lessons
provided by the themes it is possible to gain some insight into how those questions
might be addressed and into possible answers.
Is U.S. fusion research a science or an energy program?
This question has emerged as one of the most controversial now facing the
fusion program.  It seems evident that Congress intends a much larger role for basic
science and engineering research within the fusion program.  Since 1983 Congress has
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been directing DOE to increase it emphasis on science at the expense of energy
technology development.  The 1995 changes accelerated that action, and the fusion
energy science program, as the civilian fusion research effort is now called, is included
with all of the other basic research programs in DOE.  This shift includes more
emphasis on basic plasma physics in general as well as the basic plasma physics and
engineering research underlying fusion energy development.  
The latter aspect, however, sets fusion energy science research apart from DOE
basic research programs such as high energy and nuclear physics.  The basic research
supported by the fusion program has a definite purpose in mind – that is solving the
problem of harnessing the nuclear fusion reaction for peaceful energy production.82
In that sense it shares a commonality with other basic research funded by DOE, such
as most of the activities within the Basic Energy Sciences and Biological and
Environmental Science programs.  Within the fusion energy science program this
basic research “with a purpose” is highlighted by research on alternative concepts,
which attempts to determine whether alternative methods for heating and confining
plasmas might lead to a practical way to generate fusion power.  To be sure, most of
the research funded on the tokamak by DOE since the early 1970s also fell, and
continues to fall, within this category of basic research.
As discussed above, it seems clear that Congress considers the goal of practical
energy production to be the objective of fusion research.  Nevertheless, increased
emphasis on the science aspects of that quest raises a question about the program’s
future were it to be judged primarily as a science program.
If fusion research is a science program, will it be sustained?
If Congress were to decide that fusion research was to be primarily a science
program albeit with a definite goal, the question arises as to how long and at what
level it would continue to support the program.  As a science program, it may have
certain limitations that would not be there if it were considered primarily an energy
development program.  An important example concerns growth in the scale of
research facilities.  A program that was concerned only with basic plasma physics
research would likely be able to continue for several years without needing to scale
up facilities to the multi-million dollar level.  It also is possible that such a program
would be funded at levels considerably below current amounts.
If fusion science were also part of the research agenda, as it currently is, much
larger facilities would eventually be necessary to advance the science.  To be sure,
they would probably not be ITER scale, but they could reach the multi hundred
million dollar to one billion dollar level.  If Congress considered the program primarily
science-based at the time a request for such a project was made, it is doubtful that it
would approve the project without, at a minimum, substantial contributions from
international partners.  Without such facilities, the advancement potential of fusion
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Figure 2.  Magnetic Fusion Power Production Trend
science would seem more limited, and questions about whether a fusion science
program should continue would likely arise.
At this time, however, there appears to be no indication that Congress wishes to
abandon the energy goal of fusion research or reduce its priority relative to other
possible goals.  The FESAC and SEAB studies, noted with approval by Congress (see
above) in the FY2000 DOE appropriation, assume that fusion energy development is
the prime goal of the fusion research effort.83 Given this condition, then, some may
ask whether Congress would support that effort until either demonstration of practical
fusion power is clear or it is shown that fusion power would not be competitive with
other long-term energy sources.
As an energy program, how long can fusion research be sustained?
Even if the program is successful in dramatically reducing the scientific
uncertainties about fusion energy development, the time to a practical power reactor
is still likely to be substantial.  To be sure, continued scientific advances should
significantly reduce uncertainties, compared to the current state of knowledge, when
a demonstration reactor is built.  Over the past 30 years, advances towards proving
scientific feasibility of fusion have been substantial, as shown in data, provided by the
Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory, in Figure 2.  The  production of fusion power
in tokamak facilities has risen by a factor of nearly one trillion over that period.  In
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terms of the measure of power gain, or Q — that is, fusion power produced divided
by power used to heat the plasma — the largest tokamaks have achieved a value of
Q of about 0.6 when operating with a deuterium and tritium plasma.84  An operating
reactor will require a Q greater than 10.  The SEAB report concluded that “the
threshold scientific question — namely, whether a fusion system producing sufficient
net energy gain to be attractive as a commercial power source can be sustained and
controlled — can and will be solved.”85  
Demonstration of scientific feasibility, however, is only the first step towards a
practical fusion reactor.  Beyond that point lie a range of engineering challenges
including conversion of fusion energy to electricity, fueling the fusion reaction,
removing plasma ash from the reactor, and a host of other problems that must be
solved to make an economic power reactor.  Solving those problems is likely to be
just as difficult as demonstrating the underlying science.  Furthermore, the first
concept on which scientific feasibility is proven may not provide the best path to a
fusion reactor.86  Rather another concept, one that is currently less well along in its
development than the tokamak, might be a better reactor candidate. Therefore, a long
period — possibly several decades — is likely to be required before a definitive
answer about a fusion power plant is available. Such a long period means that a
substantial total funding commitment would be needed even if yearly funding levels
were about the same as those currently provided.
The long history of congressional support of fusion research suggests to many
that Congress will continue support for an extended period if progress is apparent and
specific and realistic goals and target dates are provided and adhered to.  Because
budget stringency is likely to continue for an indefinite period, however, it appears
unlikely that significant, annual budget increases will be available any time soon, if
ever.  Therefore, the program will likely have to evolve toward fusion energy
development within relatively constrained budgets.   
It is important to note, in this context, that DOE does not have a target date for
achieving commercial fusion power.  Currently, its policy is to advance plasma and
fusion science and engineering on a broad front and allow those developments to set
the pace of the program.87  There have been some estimates that it could take as long
as 50 years to reach the point that a commercial plant was possible within existing
budget levels, but it is also possible that breakthroughs in one or more of the concepts
now under investigation by DOE could shorten the time to success, but it is still likely
to be long without significantly higher funding.
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It is not clear that the progress towards demonstration of fusion energy can be
sustained for the period necessary, given this policy.  In particular, at the point larger
facilities are required, a critical decision will need to be made.  While Congress
supported the construction of large facilities in the late 1970s – primarily the TFTR
– it is uncertain whether a similar level of support would be forthcoming in the future,
given competing priorities.88
What will happen when larger facilities are requested?
Current estimates89 show that as a concept moves from the concept exploration
to the proof-of-principal stage, the total project cost would move from about less than
$10 million to the $10–100 million range.  A move to the performance extension
phase would raise project costs to anywhere from $100–500 million, and the fusion
energy development stages would require projects costing in the range of $0.5–3
billion.  In addition, the operating costs of each successive stage would increase.  For
the fusion energy development stage, operating cost estimates are anywhere from $50
to $300 million per year.  Therefore, it appears that if a promising concept is to move
to the demonstration stage — the stage following fusion energy development — a
significant increase in program budget would be necessary, the program would have
to devote most of its resources to that project alone, or both.  In addition to the
budget requirements, technical uncertainties are likely to increase as the project size
grows.  To be sure, the new program strategy of reducing scientific and engineering
uncertainties should lower the technical risk for these larger projects.  Those risks,
however, will not disappear.
The likelihood that budget constraints will remain for the indefinite future
suggests that large funding increases needed to build these projects are questionable.
If those facilities are to be built, funding would probably have to come at the expense
of other parts of the program, which could mean dramatic decline in funding for the
rest of the fusion research program.  It is also likely that only one concept could be
funded in this manner, leading to a situation similar to that of the 1980s, when the
program concentrated on the tokamak.  This situation may not be acceptable to
Congress unless it could be clearly shown that the chosen concept had the best chance
of developing into a commercial power reactor.  Even then, the historical record
suggests that many in Congress would be concerned about a possible premature
narrowing of concepts. 
Given the technical uncertainties and budget constraints, it appears that
international collaboration would be necessary to build the larger facilities needed for
the performance extension and fusion energy development stage.   While recent
statements by Congress suggest support for such collaboration, U.S. participation in
such an effort would still be governed by fiscal limitations.  Furthermore, even with
an international project with many funding sources, long periods would be necessary
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for completion and operation of the larger projects.  During the TFTR program,
Congress noted that demonstration of scientific feasibility was scheduled at several
points, only to have the actual experiments pushed further into the future.  Some
uncertainty, of course, is inherent in any project that attempts to advance the scientific
and technological knowledge base.  Continued support during long projects is likely
to require, at a minimum, clear and conservative goals and timetables.
Baring unforeseen circumstances such as a major global environmental or energy
crisis, international collaboration appears to be necessary if the U.S. is to participate
significantly in the further development of fusion energy.  Yet questions remain about
whether such collaboration would ultimately be successful. 
What would be the role of international collaboration?
International collaboration in fusion research has been a hallmark of the program
since its inception in the 1950s.  Ideas have flowed into the U.S. program from the
many countries carrying out fusion research and the United States has contributed
substantially to foreign programs.  The most notable foreign “import” was the
tokamak, which was first developed in Russia in the early 1960s.  Currently,
international fusion research efforts — primarily located in Japan and the European
Union — are considerably larger than the U.S. effort.90  Large, billion-dollar-plus
projects are now operating in both Japan and Europe.  And the largest operating
tokamak, the Joint European Torus, is located in England.  About $25 million of the
FY2000 U.S. fusion budget is spent on experimental activities that involve
international collaboration.  
 
It is also apparent to most of the worldwide fusion research community that
extensive international collaboration will be necessary if fusion R&D is to result in a
practical fusion power plant.  The primary reason is that the cost of reaching that goal
is likely to be greater than any one country is willing to pay.  Yet there remain
uncertainties about whether such collaboration can be carried off successfully,
particularly if it were to involve construction of a new large, billion dollar plus
research facility.  The ITER Engineering Design Activity (EDA) was a success in
many ways but also showed some of the pitfalls that are likely to confront future,
large-scale international fusion research projects.  First is the difficulty in making a
decision about construction of the project.  Currently, the remaining partners —
Japan, the European Union, and Russia — are operating in a three-year transition
period before that decision, originally scheduled at the conclusion of the EDA in
1998, is again considered.  Uncertainty about that decision was a leading contributor
to Congress's decision to direct DOE to terminate U.S. participation. Part of the
reason for the construction decision delay was the technical uncertainties that arose
toward the end of the project due in part to advances in tokamak theory made in the
United States.  
A second concern about ITER was how the project — if built — would be
integrated into the various national programs.  While no substantial problems were
proclaimed, it was apparent in the United States, at least, that some tension existed
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between researchers pursuing other concepts and those dedicated to the ITER
project.  If a construction decision had gone forward, that tension might have
increased because of the large domestic resources that would have been necessary for
the project.  A third concern was the role of other national issues in making decisions
about significant commitments to large, international projects.  It is apparent that
changing perceptions about the urgency of long-term energy prospects and existing
domestic economic conditions have an effect on the willingness of the partners to
make such major construction commitments.  
Nevertheless, continued and growing international collaboration appears to be
a high priority for DOE and for Congress.  A committee established by DOE to look
at how the fusion program could “maximize the effectiveness of our international
collaborations” recently recommended among other things that “future international
collaborations should be developed as an integral part of the overall U.S. fusion
program planning process — not independently.”91 While there are currently no
international construction projects in fusion, a model for such an activity in the future
may be U.S. participation in the Large Hadron Collider (LHC)  project, which
amounts to $650 million over several years.  The annual average U.S. contribution to
the LHC is less than 10% of the total annual HEP program budget. Prior to approval,
Congress directed DOE to make sure that the United States would have a
commensurate role in LHC management and that the contribution would not
negatively affect the domestic High-Energy Physics (HEP) research program. 
Under what conditions might U.S. fusion research be expanded?
So far the questions have dealt with congressional support for the  program at
or about its current level.  There may be circumstances that would increase such
support.  
From the experience of the 1970s, it appears that an upsurge of concern about
the nation’s long-term energy future might result in significant increases in the fusion
program budget as well as an acceleration of program activities.  The level of support
would depend on how promising the primary competitors of fusion as a long-term
source — solar and fission — were and what the scientific and technical status of
fusion was.  It is possible, for example, that developments in solar or fission research
could render fusion unnecessary.  At this point, however, that situation does not seem
to be the case and the potential benefits of fusion would likely keep it a high priority
research program if development of a long-term energy source became more urgent.92
In addition to sudden, real or perceived shortfalls in energy supplies, another
factor that could significantly increase attention to long-term energy sources would
be a sharp upturn in concern about global climate change.  This latter factor, of
course, was not significant during the 1970s.  Indeed, the possibility of global climate
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change induced primarily by the combustion of fossil fuels is already used by
proponents of each of the three long-term energy source candidates to help justify
budget requests. 
Another situation that could heighten interest in the United States in fusion
research is the possibility of a substantial advance in achieving fusion power by
Europe or Japan.  If it seemed possible that such a development might leave the
United States at a significant economic disadvantage, Congress might act to
accelerate the U.S. program to try and catch up.  As noted above, since the late 1960s
international competition has not been a factor in congressional response to the fusion
program budget request.  Yet when it was a factor, Congress did note that
international activity appeared to be greater than in the United States — a situation
that again exists.  If the U.S. program contained a significant international
collaboration element, however, it is probable that concerns about international
competition would be muted, although they would not be entirely eliminated, as the
experience with the ITER EDA demonstrates. 
Conclusion
The current status of the fusion program, with its dual goals of science and
energy, its increased attention to alternate concepts, and the impending convergence
of inertial and magnetic fusion approaches, reflects congressional decisions.  Yet in
many ways, the program is in an unstable state.  It cannot remain as is and hope to
achieve its goals.  Yet once the program initiates those steps needed to reach those
goals, it runs the risk of losing support by moving in a direction similar to those trod
in the past, namely, focusing on one or two concepts and requesting increasingly
larger facilities to test, prove, and develop those concepts.  The themes that emerge
from an assessment of the long historical record of congressional response to program
budget requests may have lessons for the future.  Congressional consideration of
future expansion of the fusion program will likely include:  the strength of the
scientific base for moving forward, clear and realistic scientific and technical targets,
budget realities, strength of management, and participation in a well-designed
international program.  Even then, external variables, in particular the state of the
nation’s long-term energy future, global environmental conditions, and the state of the





Table 1.  Congressional Funding of Magnetic Fusion R&D
FY1951-FY2000
        Magnetic Fusion R&D Funding - Budget Authority
Millions of Dollars      Millions of 2000 Dollars
FY Request House Senate Appro Request House Senate Appro
1951-53 1.00 1.00 7.77 7.77
1954 1.74 1.74 12.57 12.57
1955 4.72 4.72 33.60 33.60
1956 6.64 6.64 44.97 44.97
1957 10.73 10.73 69.34 69.34
1958 26.70 23.42 164.31 144.12
1959 41.14 27.97 245.27 166.75
1960 37.00 33.10 219.81 196.64
1961 29.30 30.00 169.64 173.70
1962 26.50 24.74 151.14 141.10
1963 27.80 24.17 152.89 132.92
1964 24.70 20.90 22.90 22.60 133.48 112.95 123.76 122.13
1965 23.20 23.20 23.20 23.54 123.57 123.57 123.57 125.38
1966 25.28 22.28 23.28 23.54 130.60 115.10 120.27 121.61
1967 24.38 24.38 24.38 24.16 122.12 122.12 122.12 121.01
1968 27.98 27.98 27.98 26.04 134.41 134.41 134.41 125.09
1969 29.10 28.50 28.50 28.55 132.74 130.00 130.00 130.23
1970 29.37 29.37 29.37 29.28 126.38 126.38 126.38 125.99
1971 31.55 30.44 30.55 30.26 127.77 123.28 123.72 122.55
1972 32.04 32.04 32.04 33.16 121.73 121.73 121.73 125.98
1973 40.57 40.57 40.57 39.72 146.66 146.66 146.66 143.58
1974 47.50 53.00 56.80 56.80 158.73 177.11 189.80 189.80
1975 101.80 110.80 101.80 104.80 307.71 334.92 307.71 316.78
1976 166.50 178.00 156.00 157.00 470.06 502.52 440.41 443.24
TQ 44.10 51.60 44.10 47.00 120.37 140.84 120.37 128.29
1977 289.70 324.40 311.50 312.40 756.07 846.63 812.96 815.31
1978 309.50 339.50 309.50 325.35 755.17 828.37 755.17 793.84
1979 334.00 357.70 351.90 348.90 751.48 804.81 791.76 785.01
1980 363.80 357.40 352.40 355.40 740.86 727.83 717.64 723.75
1981 396.02 394.12 394.12 394.12 730.61 727.11 727.11 727.11
1982 460.00 465.53 452.00 456.00 793.53 803.07 779.73 786.63
1983 444.10 460.10 462.80 466.10 730.87 757.20 761.65 767.08
1984 467.00 473.00 471.50 470.75 733.21 742.63 740.28 739.10
1985 483.14 419.14 470.14 440.14 730.85 634.04 711.18 665.80
1986 390.00 385.00 383.00 383.00 573.83 566.48 563.53 563.53
1987 333.00 358.00 333.00 345.50 476.82 512.62 476.82 494.72
1988 345.60 361.60 345.60 335.00 479.11 501.29 479.11 464.41
1989 360.00 343.00 356.00 351.50 479.11 456.49 473.79 467.80
1990 349.25 280.45 330.45 330.75 446.88 358.85 422.82 423.21
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1991 325.30 325.30 325.30 275.30 397.47 397.47 397.47 336.38
1992 337.10 337.10 337.10 337.10 399.33 399.33 399.33 399.33
1993 359.71 339.71 335.00 339.71 415.64 392.53 387.09 392.53
1994 347.60 347.60 342.60 347.60 392.35 392.35 386.70 392.35
1995 372.56 372.56 362.56 372.56 410.62 410.62 399.60 410.62
1996 366.05 229.14 225.14 244.14 394.49 246.94 242.63 263.11
1997 255.60 225.00 240.00 232.50 270.22 237.87 253.73 245.80
1998 225.00 225.00 240.00 232.00 233.93 233.93 249.52 241.20
1999 228.16 232.00 232.00 229.75 233.16 237.08 237.08 234.78
2000 222.61 250.00 220.61 250.00 222.61 250.00 220.61 250.00
Total 9,226.1 9,010.2 16,175.8 15,848.5
Total 9,012.8 8,875.48,825.6 8,822.0 14,904.5 14,877.0 14,718.2 14,725.0
